In March 2016, the U.S. government and the Peruvian government agreed on an agreement in place since 2003 to remove barriers to U.S. beef exports to Peru. McCalman (2002) offers another argument in favor of the appropriateness of the meistbewehrt rule. This contribution is remarkable because it is a rare example of a model that explicitly introduces negotiating conflicts into multilateral trade negotiations. In this model, a large country negotiates tariffs and transfers with N small countries, and each small country has private information about its benefits from an agreement. McCalman compares two scenarios, one in which the big country can make different offers and the other where the RULE OF THE SHACKLES ACT requires the big country to make the same offer to all countries. Of course, the big country is less well in the rule of the greatest obstruction, because the latter limits its choice, but the global efficiency may be higher under the most regulated N, and this is more likely if N is larger. The reason for this is that negotiation is ineffective on the basis of private information. If there were no negotiation, full negotiation would always lead to efficiency, and the CSDWN rule would always be a bad idea. But in the presence of private information, unrestricted negotiations are ineffective, because the large country is not in a position to cede the total surplus of the negotiations and, therefore, it is possible that the establishment of the highest surveillance will reduce the well-being of the N countries beyond the well-being of the large country95.95 The agreement has opened up one of the fastest growing markets in Latin America.