Weak areas of agreement. If the areas of agreements are weak, we have little experience to do anything with the potential energy available. While we can see the potential as individuals and groups, our agreements make it difficult to work with this potential: we tend to focus more on the necessary results and much less on developing capacities and relationships or on vision and response to potential. To be responsible for the resilience of the group`s efforts in weak chords, we tend to increase resilience by increasing the flexibility of our ability to bring people to work – our resources for the human body. From this point of view, we must be able to increase and increase the number of human bodies available for work. If we need more production, we have more jobs, and if we need less, we have fewer jobs. We can do this more effectively by ordering this group of workers for work – and keeping investments in their training and benefits low. As a result, we are focusing on the flexibility of financial capital in order to increase the number of contract positions available. Does the liquidity of this capital flexibility reduce the return on investment, as it must be more readily available? Another is the agreed rules. All countries, large or small, weak or powerful, must, on the whole, follow the same rules. There are exceptions, delays or flexibilities for poor countries, but they are still the same set of rules – flexibility is only one way to give these poorest countries the opportunity to respect the rules.
If the areas of agreements are able to use the potential energy available in the individuals present and in their interactions, the strong agreements seem to use our intention and attention – what we do, why and what we focus on – in a very different way from the weakness of the agreements. I`m curious to know what you`ll find in these two different settings. Coalitions give developing countries a stronger voice in the negotiations. The resulting agreements mean that all countries, including the most powerful, must abide by the rules. The rule of law replaces the right of power. In recent decades, democratic countries have signed hundreds of international environmental agreements (IEAs). However, most of these agreements are weak: they generally do not include effective enforcement or monitoring mechanisms. It`s a puzzle in standard business models. To study this phenomenon, we propose a positive theory of the IEA, in which political leaders would negotiate it in the shadow of re-election concerns.
We show that companies with positions in these environments tend to negotiate contracts that are at the same time too ambitious (higher than they would be in the absence of electoral problems) and weak (perhaps they could not be fully implemented). The theory also offers a new perspective for understanding investments in green technologies and highlights a channel through which countries are tempted to rely too much on technology rather than sanctions to make compliance credible.